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I. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE-HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
For the past century the employment-at-will doctrine governed the
employment relationship.' It was well settled that an employer could
terminate an employee "at-will" for any reason, a bad reason or no
reason, with impunity.2 There was an exception in the case of a con-
tract for a definite period of time; for example, a term of one year. As
* Partner, Tobias & Kraus, Cincinnati, Ohio. Chairman, Plaintiffs Employment
Lawyers Association.
** This article is adapted from sections 1.01-1.02 of TOBIAS, LITIGATING WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CLAIMS and is reprinted with the permission of the publisher,
Callaghan & Company 155 Pfingsten Road, Deerfield, Illinois 60051.
1. Under the medieval Statute of Laborers and the English rule, there was a pre-
sumption that employment was for one year. Subsequently, the English rule re-
quired a reasonable notice period before dismissal. The English rule was
displaced by the American "at-will" rule articulated by Horace G. Wood in 1877.
For concise historical summaries see Committee Report, At-Will Employment
and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REC. A. BAR. CnTy OF N.Y. No. 4, 170
(1981); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust DismissaL" Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1816, 1824-25 (1980).
2. The rule was sanctified by the United States Supreme Court in Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908), in which the Court referred to "the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee."
One court stated that an employer could discharge an employee at any time
"for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being
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a matter of law, an employee with a contract for a definite term could
not be discharged without just cause.3 But where there was a general
hiring and the term was indefinite in duration, the relationship was
deemed "at-will" and could be terminated by either party at-will, at
any time, without recourse.4 Since the turn of the century, the em-
ployment relationship has generally been regarded as contractual.
The employer promises to pay the employee a certain sum per hour,
per week, or per month, and in exchange the employee agrees to per-
form or simply performs services as directed. As the United States
Supreme Court recently noted, an informal contract of employment
may arise "by the simple act of handing a job applicant a shovel and
providing a workplace."5 This contract has been deemed an "at-will"
contract, terminable "at the will or pleasure of either party."
The "at-will" doctrine reflected the laissez faire economic philoso-
phy, stressing the freedom of the employer to run its business without
interference. Efficiency of the marketplace required that the em-
ployer have the absolute right to rid himself of employees deemed un-
desirable or who hindered the employer's ability to produce at a
profit.6
H. EXCEPTIONS TO AT-WILL DOCTRINE
There have always been exceptions to the "at-will" doctrine in
cases in which the employee was able to negotiate a restriction in the
employment contract or in which the legislature has established limi-
tations by statute. Three groups of employees have traditionally been
protected from wrongful discharge by such exceptions. First, com-
pany executives, entertainers, and other highly paid employees are
typically protected because they have sufficient individual bargaining
power to obtain written contracts of fixed and definite terms. In such
situations, the employer's duty to discharge only for "just cause" is
guilty of a legal wrong." Payne v. Western & Atlantic RIR., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20
(1884).
3. Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chemical Co., 100 Idaho 785, 605 P.2d 963(1980).
4. "[Ihe rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is primafacie a hiring
at will; and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon
him to establish it by proof." Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117,121,
42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895) (quoting H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 136 (2d ed.
1886)).
5. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,74 (1984). "[Ihe contract of employment
may be written or oral, formal or informal; an informal contract of employment
may arise by the simple act of handing a job applicant a shovel and providing a
workplace." Id.
6. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom:. On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Summers, Individ-
ual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481
(1976).
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implied by law or expressly set forth in the agreement. 7
Second, employees who are covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments negotiated by their respective unions also typically are not fired
except for "just cause." Most labor agreements contain a specific pro-
hibition against "at-will" termination.8 Third, public employees cov-
ered by state and federal civil service statutes generally cannot be
fired except for "just cause" and not until they have been given a hear-
ing, which is subject to court review.9
Excluding the above three groups, the remaining nonunion private
sector exceeds 60% of the American work force and consists of over
65,000,000 employees. For them there has been no blanket protection
from the "at-will" doctrine.
A. Special Purpose Legislation
During the last 50 years, there has been a growth of limited protec-
tion against discriminatory discharges from special purpose legisla-
tion. Discharge because of union activity, race, religion, sex, national
origin, age, and handicap has been prohibited under state and federal
antidiscrimination statutes.'0 Retaliatory discharges of persons exer-
cising their statutory or constitutional rights have also been out-
lawed.1 ' Many government employees have job rights which are
considered property rights under the United States Constitution.12
They have some protection against arbitrary and discriminatory dis-
missal.'3 They also have the right to fair procedures under the United
States Constitution.14 In addition, government employees cannot be
discharged for exercising their constitutional rights of free speech,
religion, privacy, and liberty.15
7. Bartlett v. Doctors Hosp., 422 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
8. For an excellent discussion of the "just cause" provisions of labor agreements as
interpreted by arbitrators see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKouRI, How ARBITRATION
WoRKs 650-707 (4th ed. 1985).
9. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 19572 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW
§ 75 (McKinney 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 31, § 41 (West 1979 & Supp.
1988). See also Federal Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 et. seq. (1982).
10. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (Union Activity); Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1982)
(Race, etc.); Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 19 U.S.C. § 623
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Age); The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, §§ 501, 503, 504
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Handicap).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 612(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (ADEA); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (FLSA); 29
U.S.C. § 651 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (OSHA).
12. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
13. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
14. Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
15. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (free speech); Schware v. Board of Bar
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B. Tort Remedies
Until recently, there was no tort of wrongful discharge. The con-
cept of dismissal in violation of public policy had not yet been appliedf
to nonunion employees. In addition, little effort was made to invoke
implied or unilateral contract analysis for victims of wrongful dis-
charge in breach of employer promises of job security. Lastly, the old-
fashioned torts of defamation, negligence, assault, privacy, and fraud
were only occasionally invoked by nonunion employees and then only
in outrageous circumstances.
C. Movement for Change
The concept of "just cause" as the proper standard governing
wrongful discharge cases was carefully developed by labor arbitrators
who have heard thousands of discharge cases during the past half cen-
tury.16 Their opinions were published and popularized. Companies
and workers, with experience and knowledge of union shops, came to
appreciate the concept of fairness in the workplace.
Meanwhile, the "job" became more and more important. After
World War II the trend of declining loyalty to home, family, church,
neighborhood, and community accelerated. The job became the prime
source of identity and a major social unit for millions of Americans.
For many, career and workplace was the focus of their lives.
"Discharge" was labeled as the capital punishment of the industrial
world. Indeed, its effects are devastating.17 The average American
has less than three months pay in savings. The loss of income caused
by a discharge causes severe economic hardship. Employees dis-
charged for alleged "cause" may be denied unemployment compensa-
tion. Group medical insurance coverage stops soon after the date of
termination.
The discharged employee suffers intense emotional distress. He
has been labeled a failure. His self-esteem, which was wrapped up
with his job, is gone. A discharge for substandard performance is a
severe blow to the ego.
There is harm to a discharged employee's reputation. Fellow
workers, relatives, neighbors, peers, and friends are bound to think
less of him. Standing in the eyes of family members suffers. From a
practical standpoint, a dischargee will have difficulty in getting a new
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (liberty); IAttlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765 (6th Cir.
1985) (privacy).
16. See Koven & Smith, Just Cause: The Seven Tests, (Blackacre series on Discipline
& Discharge, Coloacre Publications, 1985).
17. See R. COULsON, THE TERMNATION HANDBOOK (1981); W. MORIN AND I.
CABRERA, PARTING COMPANY (1982); E. GOODMAN, ALL THE JusTIcE I COULD AF-
FORD (1983).
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job. Prospective employers routinely ask applicants questions about
former employment. A person discharged for alleged misconduct is
not a prime candidate for reemployment. A dismissal for dishonesty
may destroy career opportunities forever.
Given the seriousness of the consequences of wrongful discharge, it
is no wonder that pressure for change in the law began to build. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the catalyst for further change. The term
"discrimination" was widely publicized and soon became a household
word. Government investigators swarmed into American businesses
questioning the fairness of discharges of minority members. The
stated issue was whether there was inequality in the treatment of
blacks and whites. However, every case made an inquiry into whether
the employer had a reasonable, fair cause for its actions. Rank and file
employees became accustomed to examining issues of discrimination
and fairness on a wide variety of subjects.
By the late Sixties America had become a litigious society. The
number of lawyers had skyrocketed. Citizens were willing to take on
"City Hall" and other establishment institutions in the courtroom.
There was a movement toward democracy in the workplace. Authori-
tarian, top-down, military-like methods of running a business became
discredited. The idea that management could do no wrong and that
nonunion workers were powerless was fading. Americans became
more assertive, more selfish, and more aware of their rights as
individuals.
The Nuremberg trial and the civil disobedience movement dramat-
ically raised the issue of whether people had moral rights to disobey
improper or illegal orders issued by supervisors. These concepts
filtered into the workplace where employees began to question orders
of superiors which were unsafe or illegal. The Vietnam War and the
Watergate crisis further eroded the confidence of citizens in their in-
stitutions and in authority. No longer was loyalty to the company, to
the union, an all important virtue.'8 A forerunner of the nonunion
individual employee rights movement was the emergence of the duty
of fair representation. This duty was a shield for individual union
members who were victims of arbitrary grievance handling in dis-
charge cases.19
The last twenty years have seen an explosion of interest in em-
ployee rights. The women's rights movement produced a revolution in
the role of women in the workplace. Women, by protest, EEOC fil-
ings, and court action have put teeth into the antigender bias provi-
sions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts. Every decision discharging
18. See Job Loyalty: Not the Virtue It Seems, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1985, § 3 at 1,
which discusses the demise of the concept of undivided loyalty to the corporate
employer.
19. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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a women is a potential source of litigation and is subject to strict scru-
tiny as to its fairness. Previously, women had kept quiet when they
were fired for reasons related to sexual harassment. However, in re-
cent years, such women, acting with more candor and courage, have
produced more legal confrontations.2 0 Similarly, the federal Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA), passed in 1967, has become a
vehicle for the white male over 40 to protest unfair discharges. In
1985, there were about 17,000 ADEA charges filed. Large jury ver-
dicts, often in six figures, in favor of long service employees, reflect
the public sympathy for the plight of the wrongfully discharged
worker. State and federal legislation protecting handicapped employ-
ees from discrimination has also had a dramatic impact upon the
workplace.
Americans have never accepted the idea that while it is illegal to
discriminate against particular groups because of bias concerning a
group, it is permissible to discriminate against individuals because of
purely personal animus. To the contrary, most people believe it is ille-
gal to discriminate for any arbitrary reason. Most workers believe
that unequal treatment, solely because of a personality conflict unre-
lated to work, also is illegal.
Beginning in the late 1960's, there was a cry from academics to
abolish the "at-will" doctrine.21 There was an accompanying revolu-
tion taking place outside the workplace. More and more individuals
sought to solve society's problems by going to the courthouse. Law-
suits became a national pastime. '"Whistleblowers" and other rebel-
lious workers became folk heroes. The stage was set for a revolution
in the law regarding nonunion workers. In the late 1970's the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine began to collapse. The doctrine giving private
employers total freedom to discharge made no sense. It may have
been appropriate for Nineteenth-Century America, but not for the
1980's. Court after court began to hold that there were remedies for
victims of outrageous discharge, even in the nonunion, nongovern-
ment workplace. The judiciary responded to the public's desire to see
justice in the workplace.22
20. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
21. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM L. REv. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen, Strangers
No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause"Prtection Under Title VII, 2
INDUS. REr. L.J. 519 (1978); Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment" A Neces-
sary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Suimers, Individual Protec-
tion Against Unjust Dismissal. Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976);
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
22. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981); Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,427 A.2d 385
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Within the last decade, the courts of the majority of the states have
created numerous exceptions to the "at-will" doctrine. Relying on
principles of contract law, judges began looking at the totality of the
circumstances at the workplace to determine whether it was reason-
able for employees to expect that they would be fired only for just
cause.2 3 Verbal promises, handbooks, and policy manuals began to be
enforced as contracts.24 California and a few other states imposed
upon employers a duty of good faith and fair dealing concerning termi-
nation decisions.25 In addition, in most states the tort of wrongful dis-
charge is now established where the employee has engaged in conduct
protected by statute and the discharge undermines the public policy of
the statute.26 Finally, other torts and theories of recovery independ-
ent of a claim of unjust or abusive discharge began to be used more
and more for the benefit of discharged employees. 27
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
During the last few years the media has directed public attention
to wrongful discharge litigation. National newspapers and magazines
have featured stories concerning the "death of the at-will doctrine." 28
There have been several widely publicized million-dollar verdicts fea-
tured on television and in the newspapers. 29
In reaction to the growing number of wrongful termination suits,
(1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
23. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985); Mers
v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
24. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980);
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.E.2d 193, 443 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
25. See Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machs. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208
Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 720 P.2d
257, (Mont. 1986).
26. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610
P.2d 1330 (1980); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IlM. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). Cf Frampton
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (a leading early
"public policy" case).
27. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Bissell Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (negli-
gence); Andrews v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 474 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (slan-
der); Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58 (1979)
(outrage); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985) (privacy).
28. See, e.g., National Law Journal, Jan. 20, 1986 at 1, col. 2 ; Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 13, 1983 at 1, col. 6; USA Today, Feb. 18, 1986 at 34, col. 1.
29. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1983)
($1,900,000 to 3 plaintiffs); Rawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 39 Empl. Pract. Decs.
35, 818 (D. Colo. 1985) (fifty-nine year old salesman fired after thirty-three years
received a $15 million jury verdict); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d
212 (1985) (verdict of $1,300,000 awarded to four Baltimore employees in January
1984), cert denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985). National Law Journal, Aug.
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there have been a large number of educational seminars for the bene-
fit of employer representatives, personnel and human resources direc-
tors, and house counsel. In addition, Bar Associations have featured
seminars on the subject of wrongful discharge cases. Numerous arti-
cles and books concerning termination have been published within re-
cent years.30
This public awareness of the emerging rights of dismissed employ-
ees has several results: (1) employees who are discharged are likely to
seek legal counsel to find out their rights; (2) there are an increasing
number of employees who threaten litigation; (3) there are an increas-
ing number of lawyers specializing in employment law;3 ' (4) law
schools are broadening their curriculum to include more courses on
individual rights;32 and (5) there are more wrongful discharge suits.
Most employers are becoming increasingly cautious concerning dis-
charges. Listening to the advice of their personnel directors and law-
yers, employers now normally make careful investigations prior to
discharge. They usually utilize progressive discipline and warnings.
They are more careful to document their cases. The employers are
motivated by fear of litigation and current modern concepts of ethical
responsibility.
Corporate America has studied the Japanese system of employ-
ment relations which stresses unity of interest between company and
employee and a paternalistic company attitude which stresses job se-
curity and lifetime employment. Corporate America is beginning to
recognize that fairness to employees is good ethics and also good busi-
ness. Job security, a system of just discipline, and humane severance
programs help employee morale and improve productivity. Such prac-
4, 1986, at 8, col. 1 (verdict of $10 million awarded a former Exxon Corporation
executive).
30. H. PERITT, EMPLOYEE DISmSSAL LAW & PRACTICE (1984); M. DICHTER, A. GROSS,
D. MORKAVA & S. SAUNTRY, EMPLOYEE DIsImssAL LAw FORMS & PROCEDURES
(1986); C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
(1983); L. BoROwVSKy, UNJUST DISMISSAL LAW & PRACTICE (1986); J. McCARTHY,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CASES (1985); C. RICHEY, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION & CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS (1986); W. HOLLOWAY & M.
LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1935); A. PEPE & R.
DUNHAM, AVOIDING & DEFENDING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAms. (1987).
31. In 1985 a new national organization consisting of lawyers specializing in repre-
senting individual employees was formed called the Plaintiff Employment Law-
yers Association (PELA) and already has over 600 members.
32. In 1982 the author, Paul H. Tobias, surveyed the curriculum of 15 leading law
schools. No law school had a course labeled "Employment Law." The main
course at each school was called "labor law," and covered union-company rela-
tionships, NLRB law, collective bargaining, and arbitration. Usually there was a
seminar on a specialized subject such as antidiscrimination statutes, public em-
ployees, or women's rights. Today the words "employment law" are being used
more and more. The law relating to the individual employee in the nonunion
workplace is being examined as never before.
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tices boost the image of the company and even enhance the value of
the company stock. Although the number of dismissals continues to
be substantial nationwide,3 3 the proportion of cruel, outrageous dis-
missals has, in the opinion of the author, decreased.
Also, employers are becoming more generous concerning the pay-
ment of severance pay and other postdismissal benefits. In years past,
the tradition was payment of two weeks, or at most one month sever-
ance pay. Some enlightened companies, when laying off salaried em-
ployees for economic reasons, now provide as much as two weeks pay
for every year of service plus health insurance coverage for at least
ninety days.3 4 Employers are more likely to give severance pay to em-
ployees dismissed for unsatisfactory performance and noneconomic
reasons. Employers are now more willing to make prelitigation settle-
ments, involving letters of recommendation, expungement of files,
and some cash.
The plight of the dismissed, older worker has captured the sympa-
thy of the country. Willy Loman, the central figure in famous play
"Death of a Salesman," dramatized the dilemma:
There were promises made across the desk! You mustn't tell me you've got
people to see-I put thirty-four years into this firm ... and now I can't pay my
insurance! You can't eat the orange and throw the peel away-a man is not a
piece of fruit.3
5
Victims of age discrimination are well protected by the ADEA and
state age discrimination statutes. The right to a jury trial and the liq-
uidated, double damages provided by the statute provide powerful in-
centives for management to be cautious in handling dismissals of older
workers. Corporations are now forced to be scrupulously fair to all
protected groups in their decisions concerning layoffs, reductions in
force (RIF's), and early retirement programs.
A current phenomenon is the "window" program initiated by large
corporations who wish to "cut the fat," and reduce costs by the layoff
of older middle management employees. 36 To avoid layoff, employees
fifty-five and over are now given a limited opportunity (the "window"
is open for short period of time) to obtain increased pension provisions
33. One expert estimates that of the 60,000,000 nonunion, noncivil service "at-will"
employees, approximately 3% to 5% or about 2,000,000 are fired without a hear-
ing. At least 150,000 to 200,000 employees are unjustly fired and would win cases
under the "just cause standard" used by labor arbitrators if they filed claims.
Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment At Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557 (1985).
34. Unfortunately these programs are still in the minority. Most shut downs and
mass layoffs involve insufficient notice and very little financial or emotional help
for those affected. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1986 at D1, Col. 3.
35. A. MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN, Act III at 69 (1949).
36. "In the last four years almost 500,000 able and seasoned managers have been jet-
tisoned from the payrolls--and the futures-of America's largest corporations."
Goldstein, What Future For Middle Managers?, INDUSTRY WEEK Dec. 8, 1986, at
45.
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and generous severance pay packages. In exchange they are required
to sign a release of all legal rights.
The recent wave of takeovers, buyouts, mergers, and corporate re-
shuffling has made executives more and more aware of their own legal
rights. Executive employment contracts for company presidents and
chief executive officers now routinely contain "golden parachute" pro-
visions protecting them from sudden termination. Because company
presidents are more sensitized to the possibility of wrongful discharge
of themselves, they are more likely to be empathetic to their employ-
ees who are innocent victims of buyouts and mergers.
The policy of equal treatment and no discrimination for irrelevant
reasons continues to grow. It is no accident that the major component
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is the obligation of employers
to treat like cases in a nondiscriminatory manner.37 There are a grow-
ing number of states that prohibit discrimination because of a handi-
cap, sexual preference, marital status, and other unfair discrimination
not yet prohibited by federal law.38
In a democracy, court decisions tend to follow the "ballot box" and
reflect not only the wisdom of the past, but also what the majority of
the people presently desire. The law is now more responsive to "man-
on-the-street" concepts of "fairness" in dismissal cases. "Fairness" is a
right concept-an idea whose time has finally come to the work place.
California has led the way. In California, every employment rela-
tionship carries a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Victims of bad
faith discharges can receive damages for emotional distress and loss of
self esteem as well as punitive damages. The average jury verdict is in
excess of $200,000.39
In other states, victims of tortious misconduct involving breach of
privacy, defamation, fraud, assault, negligence, outrage, interference
with contract, or false imprisonment often receive large verdicts.
Every wrongful dismissal case is a potential defamation case.
When a supervisor publishes a false reason for a termination to others
who have no need to know, there may be employer liability if malice
37. "The duty of fair dealing is, simply stated, a requirement that like cases can be
treated alike." Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machs. Corp., 162 Cal. App.
3d 241, 247-48, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (1985).
38. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 (West Supp. 1988) (marital status); N.Y. CIv.
RIGHTs LAW § 47(a) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988) (handicap); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 149, § 196 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (anti-polygraph exam).
39. From 1979 to 1983, fifty-one wrongful dismissal cases went to trial in California.
The plaintiff won seventy percent of the decisions with an average award of
$178,184. Nineteen cases included punitive damages with the verdicts averaging
$533,317. Stieber, Recent Developments in EmploymentAt Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557
(1985); Wrongful Discharge, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Aug. 19,1983, at 4, col.2.
Since 1983 the average jury verdict in California has been between $200,000 and
$400,000. 4 Empl. Rel. Weekly (BNA) 1294, (Oct. 20, 1986).
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or reckless disregard for the truth is shown. The doctrine of negli-
gence-which requires all citizens knowledgeable of risk of harm to
act carefully towards others-may assist those who have been finan-
cially damaged by the reckless activity of employers and their agents.
Where a dismissal directly undermines the purpose of a state stat-
ute, the law of most states now permits suits alleging abusive or
wrongful discharge. Examples include employees fired for filing
workers' compensation claims, attending jury duty, refusing to com-
mit perjury, and for "whistleblowing" (e.g., reporting crimes to gov-
ernment agencies). Whether the "public policy" tort encompasses
violations of policies embodied in judicial decisions and community
values, as well as statutes, remains a hotly debated issue.
There is an increased focus on rights of privacy in the workplace.
Government workers fired because of reasons related to marriage,
sex, and pregnancy claim constitutional protection. Victims of dismis-
sals related to sexual harassment, in addition to claims of Title VII
violation, can claim interference with privacy as well. There is an in-
creased governmental and corporate effort to stamp out the use of
drugs, showing little concern for individual rights. Employees fired
for refusal to submit to random drug testing may indeed have grounds
for suit.
Outside of California, common-law tort theories provide limited
protection, but only in aggravated, outrageous cases in which there has
been flagrant cruelty on the part of management in the handling of a
dismissal. The victim of a run-of-the-mill unfair, arbitrary but nondis-
criminatory dismissal may not be able to claim a tort. A breach of
employment contract theory may be all that is available.
Most medium to large size companies have written rules, written
procedures, employee handbooks, and policy manuals which contain
provisions which can be reasonably construed to prohibit unjust, un-
fair dismissals. Millions of nonunion workers are covered by these
handbooks. The lead Michigan case and its progeny set forth that
these rules can be enforced in court.40 Other cases have held that
other indicia of employer intent-verbal promises, practices, and cus-
toms of the shop-which raise employee expectations of job security
create enforceable contractual rights.41
But most employers, now sensitive to the possibility of suit, have
very recently sanitized their handbooks and inserted disclaimer
clauses which restate the right to fire "at-will" and negate the idea
that company rules are binding or contractual. The courts are now
struggling with these "disclaimer" clauses and their impact on em-
40. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
41. Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
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ployee expectations. 42 The principles of reliance, adhesion, and legal
presumptions against the draftsman may assist the employee to over-
come the unfair effect of these disclaimers.
Another developing "defense" to employee litigation is the "in-
house" internal appeal system, which features a complaint handling
procedure similar to the grievance machinery in union shops. The em-
ployee has no union or lawyer to help him, and the "judges" are often
closely allied with the "prosecutors" who fired him. However, the in-
ternal systems do give the dismissed worker a "day in court" and often
lead to some adjustment.
In the last few years employers have fought increasingly hard to
defeat employee dismissal claims in court. In addition to the "dis-
claimer" defense, employers have effectively used the federal "pre-
emption" defense to try to destroy the right of union workers covered
by labor agreements to take advantage of favorable state laws.4 3 The
"pre-emption" defense is also invoked where other federal and state
statutes cover some of the issues raised in common-law suits."4 Also,
the defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata have been used to
defeat claims of employees forced to litigate their claims in separate
administrative and judicial tribunals.45
The federal courts at one time were the leaders of progressive judi-
cial thinking favoring employee rights. However, in recent years, ap-
pointments by Republican presidents have added a conservative hue
to the federal bench. Federal judges are now more receptive to em-
ployer motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. There is
a growing judicial resistance to further rapid expansion of employee
rights.
Generally, the laws relating to damages do not favor the individual
employee. Under Title VII, the NLRA, the ADEA, and most federal
antidiscrimination acts, damages for loss of self esteem or mental
anguish are not recoverable. Similarly, labor arbitrators do not award
damages for pain and suffering. Also, victims of breach of employ-
ment contracts cannot recover for mental distress or receive punitive
damages. Yet, the emotional wounds run deep, endure, and cry out for
relief. In addition, employers have little incentive to obey contracts
without the fear of large verdicts.
The duty to mitigate doctrine punishes those who are most diligent
42. See Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987); Thompson v.
Kings Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1987).
43. See Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987).
44. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Walsh v. Con-
solidated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977).
45. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986); Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and aggressive in their postdischarge job search. Employees offered
reinstatement may be too upset because of the dismissal trauma to go
back to the hostile environment, yet the law requires the plaintiff to
accept the job or risk losing his right to damages. 46
Most employees bringing court actions are middle management
personnel with the funds to pay substantial retainers to counsel.
Many victims of unfair dismissals with only modest damages have
trouble finding a lawyer to take their case. If there is no statutory
violation there is no court awarded fee for the prevailing plaintiff. If
there is no tort, there is no prospect of a large verdict. Thus, there is
little incentive for the lawyer to take an ordinary case. Employee-em-
ployer cases are hard fought and time consuming. Most lawyers are
not willing to take a mere breach of employment contract case on a
straight contingency basis because of the risks and unlikelihood of
much reward.
For the vast majority of nonunion employees, a court suit is still
not an effective or readily available avenue for relief. The court sys-
tem is too cumbersome, expensive, and time consuming for most cases.
There has been much academic interest in national or model state
legislation providing statutory noncourt protection against unjust dis-
missal for nonunion employees.47 Such national legislation exists in
every other western nation.48 Arbitration is the favored litigation tri-
bunal, although enforcement by existing state unemployment com-
pensation agencies, the NLRB, or a new administrative agency are
reasonable alternatives. Many proposals would put a ceiling on the
damages available and would eliminate the recovery of punitive and
emotional distress damages.
A federal law covering the entire country and providing uniform
standards would be the best approach. It offers the possibility of com-
bining all federal antidiscrimination and other federal and state claims
in one hearing, thus avoiding the present multiplicity of remedies and
hearings. Most proposals favor a short statute of limitations of six
months or less and a very limited right of judicial review of the arbi-
tration or agency award. Relaxed rules of evidence, payment of attor-
neys' fees to the worker if he prevails, government payment of the
costs and expenses of the tribunal, and flexibility concerning remedies
are other desirable features.
Many management representatives favor a system which elimi-
nates the possibility of jury trials and large punitive and emotional
46. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
47. See, e.g., Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need For A
Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983).
48. The English Industrial Tribunals handle some 40,000 cases per year. For the Brit-
ish system see L. DICKENS, M. JONES, B. WEEKES & M. HART, DISMISsED: A
STUDY OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL & THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL SYSTEM (1985).
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distress damages. Most of the plaintiff's bar opposes restrictions on
jury trial and damages. A compromise might be to provide a small
claims type arbitration or administrative tribunal, which would be ap-
propriate for most cases and could be invoked by the worker at his
option. However, the courts would still be open for the larger, more
complicated wrongful discharge cases.
In spite of interesting debate as to the content of such a statute,49
there seems to be little likelihood of state or federal legislation in the
near future.
We are an affluent society which is concerned with the quality of
life. Much of the important things that go on in the average Ameri-
can's life happen at work.
There are many emotional, social, and psychological needs which
the job satisfies. As other elements of society decline in importance,
the job becomes more important. Justice William Douglas once said:
"Employability is the greatest asset most people have."5 0
Similarly, one court has stated:
Every man's employment is of utmost importance to him. It occupies his time,
his talents, and his thoughts. It controls his economic destiny. It is the means
by which he feeds his family and provides for their security. It bears upon his
personal well-being, his mental and physical health.
In days gone by, a man's occupation literally gave him his name. Even to-
day, a continuous and secure employment contributes to a sense of identity for
most people.5 '
The wrongful dismissal event is a significant financial and emo-
tional trauma-one of the great tragedies for an American family.
American nonunion workers want to have their cake and eat it too.
They want the right to be free of wrongful discharge and to have a
meaningful remedy for injustice. But they are unwilling to accept the
detriments and sacrifices of unionism. Instead, nonunion workers
have turned to private lawyers as their "business agents."
The private bar has creatively expanded the rights of employees to
the point where the exceptions to the "at-will" doctrine now have al-
most swallowed the rule. The legal trends are walking hand-in-hand
with the mood of the nation.
The current flow and trend of the common-law has slowed up
somewhat during the past months. Still, the number of lawsuits in-
creases.52 We can expect the next decade to see a more orderly devel-
49. The American Bar Association Labor and Employment Law Section, Committee
on Employee Rights and Responsibilities, Subcommittee on At-Will Legislation,
is studying the issues and developing "cafeteria" model statutes containing alter-
native options available for state legislators who may be interested.
50. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 95 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
51. Lowe v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 205
N.W.2d 167 (1973).
52. A recent survey showed a thirty-seven percent increase in reported dismissal de-
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opment of employment law assisting dismissed employees to obtain
increased rights and benefits.
cisions in 1985 compared to 1984. Report, ABA Labor and Employment Law Sec-
tion Employee Rights Committee and Judicial Subcommittee 1985 case review
(1986).
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